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Abstract  
Using the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings we explore whether the fortunes of 
employees paid for performance differ from those of fixed pay workers during recession. 
Only in the bottom quintile of the wage distribution were performance pay employees more 
likely to experience greater falls in real wages than fixed pay employees. Accounting for 
fixed unobserved worker characteristics suggests this was not due to the wage-setting 
mechanism itself, but that other factors are likely to be at play. While across most of the 
earnings distribution there was little evidence of greater wage flexibility among 
performance pay employees, they did have longer job tenure than fixed pay employees 
over the recession.  
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
The period since the financial crisis of 2008 has seen very low rates of growth in 
nominal earnings, and a decline in real earnings on a scale not experienced for many years. 
At the same time employment levels have held up much better than past experience would 
have suggested given the sharp fall in output in 2008/9 and the four years of stagnation 
which followed. While there have been a number of discussions of these aggregate trends, 
including some which have sought to map the trajectories for individual workers (e.g. Elsby 
et al, 2013; Gregg et al., 2014), there has been relatively little in-depth analysis of the role 
of wage-setting mechanisms in either exposing workers to risk or protecting them from it 
through this period.1  
For many employees a share of their total wage is conditional upon their 
performance, or the performance of some broader unit to which they belong, such as a 
team, a department or the whole firm. In this paper we examine whether employees in these 
performance pay jobs fared differently in terms of wage growth and labour market 
prospects through the recent recession than their counterparts in fixed pay jobs. In theory 
we might anticipate that, since performance pay workers share the income risks of 
economic shocks with their employers, their earnings may be more flexible than those of 
fixed pay employees, at least in the depths of recession. However, for this very reason, they 
may experience more stable employment patterns than fixed pay workers, whose ‘stickier’ 
wages may make them susceptible to job loss. This micro behaviour would, at a macro 
level translate into bonuses playing the role suggested by Gordon (1982) as a factor 
facilitating wage flexibility and thus employment stability in the face of macro-economic 
fluctuations. 
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The relationship between profit-sharing, employment and wages was studied by 
Wadhwani and Wall (1990) using company data.  Instead we look at data on individual 
workers and consider a broader definition of performance pay that goes beyond profit 
sharing. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to explore the contribution of 
performance pay to wage flexibility in the recent recession. We explore how the evolution 
of wage growth has differed among individuals in performance pay jobs compared with 
workers in jobs where there is no performance pay component, both for all workers as well 
as considering differences between workers at different points in the earnings distribution. 
As well as examining the consequences for wage flexibility we consider the implications 
for job tenure. Our primary data source is the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings: it 
provides very accurate information on earnings and allows us to follow individuals over 
time; this longitudinal component to the survey enables us to move beyond a simple 
identifier of the receipt of performance pay and to arrive at a more comprehensive 
identification of employees that are working in performance pay jobs. Our analysis is 
conducted for the private sector only, where performance pay is more prevalent.2  
The paper is organised as follows.  Section Two provides a brief overview of the 
literature and sets out our key hypotheses. Section Three introduces the data. Section Four 
presents our results, and Section Five concludes. 
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2. Existing evidence and hypotheses 
In the period before the financial crisis nominal average earnings typically grew by 
around four to five per cent per annum (Levy, 2013: Figure A4). This growth rate briefly 
fell below zero in early 2009 and, after a short bounce, settled in the region of one to two 
per cent over the period 2010-2012. Movements in nominal regular pay (excluding 
bonuses) were less pronounced over this period, but the growth rate similarly fell by at 
least half, from around four per cent before 2008 to around one to two per cent in the 
subsequent years. At the level of the individual worker, instances of zero wage growth and 
wage cuts also became more common, with Gregg et al. (2014) finding that, among 
employees working in the same job between 2009 and 2012, around one third received a 
cut in their nominal hourly base pay in at least one year of the downturn.  
In theory, we may expect the wages of performance pay workers to show greater 
flexibility in a downturn, as employers are perhaps more readily able to adjust labour costs 
where wages include a performance element. Some past studies provide empirical support 
for this;  Nickell and Quintini (2003), using the New Earnings Survey (NES) for the period 
1975-1995, found that workers who received some performance pay were less likely to 
experience a freeze in nominal pay, and more likely to experience a nominal pay cut, than 
fixed pay workers. They therefore suggested that performance pay was a key element in 
wage flexibility, although they noted that even among workers with no performance pay, 
a considerable proportion still received pay cuts. In contrast, Smith (2000), using the British 
Household Panel Survey for the period 1991-1996, reported no difference in the proportion 
of employees receiving a nominal pay cut between those that received bonuses and those 
that did not. For the US, Devereux (2001) showed greater wage cyclicality for workers paid 
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by piece rate or commission compared to salaried or hourly paid workers over the period 
1970-1991. Devereux also showed that, among salaried workers, a major source of 
variation in their total earnings was due to variation in performance pay and overtime, 
rather than the salary component. He hypothesised that if these forms of performance pay 
were to become more common, greater wage cyclicality would be observed in the economy 
at large.  
An alternative perspective is obtained by considering the impact of regional or 
industry specific shocks. Lemieux et al. (2012), using the US Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, find that while wages of performance pay workers downwardly adjust in 
response to local labour market shocks (proxied by an increase in the local unemployment 
rate), those of fixed pay workers do not. Furthermore, such shocks lead to a reduction in 
hours worked for fixed pay workers while hours worked by performance pay workers are 
unaffected. Pischke (2016) investigates the response of wages and employment to the 
housing cycle for three occupations in the housing sector with varying forms of wage 
contract. The wages of real estate agents (for whom performance pay accounts for a 
considerable part of their remuneration) are found to be more flexible in response to a 
labour demand shock than wages of architects and construction workers, while their 
employment is less affected.  
  Other evidence does suggest that it is not only performance pay workers who have 
wages that are sensitive to fluctuations in the fortunes of their employer. The literature on 
rent-sharing indicates that, after controlling for the characteristics of individual employees, 
the wage that the average employee receives is sensitive to the profitability of the firm in 
which they are employed (Blanchflower et al., 1996), although the recent work of Bell and 
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Van Reenen (2011) does suggest an important role for performance pay in distributing any 
rents across workers within a given firm.  
 Wage flexibility is not the only reason why firms might offer bonuses however. To 
the extent that firms employ people who belong to salary-based pension schemes rather 
than defined contribution pension schemes, wages paid by means of bonuses have the 
attraction that they are typically not pensionable. Thus, bonuses may simply be a means of 
offering increased take-home pay at lower cost to the employer than would a seemingly 
equivalent base salary. If this were an important aspect of bonuses, they might be little 
more flexible than base pay. Another reason why firms might pay bonuses is because they 
think that they should: if both parties to the wage contract regard bonuses as a normal part 
of remuneration (a key conjecture of Wadwhani and Wall, 1990), then any tax surcharge 
or statutory cap on bonuses would be translated one for one into higher basic pay. Broader 
research by Green and Heywood (2016) suggests that bonus payments are not divorced 
from base wages and that there is a degree of substitution between the two.  
 Finally, bonuses may be a part of a structure of relative incentives within the firm; 
to the extent that bonus arrangements allow firms to reward individuals who perform above 
average and to penalise those who perform below it, they will play much the same role in 
bad times as in good. 
Given the above, we explore four hypotheses relating to the experiences of 
performance pay workers in recession: 
 
Hypothesis 1: employees in performance pay jobs have experienced greater flexibility in 
earnings than fixed pay workers through recession  
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For the reasons outlined above we expect that, in a longitudinal setting, workers in 
performance pay jobs will experience greater flexibility in their wages than workers in 
fixed pay jobs. We focus on wage changes among employees who remain in the same job 
from one year to the next. We are then able to focus on the degree of wage flexibility that 
is apparent under different wage-setting mechanisms in continuing jobs.  
 
Hypothesis 2: the extent to which wage flexibility in performance pay jobs exceeds wage 
flexibility in fixed pay jobs will be greater at higher points in the wage distribution 
 Our second hypothesis focuses on whether experiences of performance pay workers 
have differed according to their position in the earnings distribution. For the US, Guvenen 
et al (2014) show that earnings among the top 1% of earners are more pro-cyclical than for 
the average. We also know from existing literature that employees at the top end of the 
earnings distribution are much more likely to be in performance pay jobs and receive a 
greater proportion of their total pay in the form of bonuses. For the UK, Bell and Van 
Reenen (2011) find substantial rent-sharing for chief executive officers (CEOs), with 
smaller effects lower down the corporate hierarchy. Their work suggests that the main 
mechanism for rent-sharing is through the use of cash bonuses; CEOs receive more of their 
remuneration as bonuses than do other workers, and base salaries are not very responsive 
to firm performance. For these reasons, we hypothesise that wages of performance pay 
workers will show even greater flexibility than the wages of fixed pay workers at higher 
points in the earnings distribution.  
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Hypothesis 3: performance pay workers were less likely to experience changes in hours 
worked in recession than fixed pay workers 
Hypothesis 4: employees in performance pay jobs experienced longer job tenure through 
recession than employees in fixed pay jobs 
Employers may of course take other actions than changes to wage rates in response to 
recession. Where employers have less flexibility over the wage rate paid to their 
employees, an alternative action when faced with increasing cost pressures may be to 
reduce labour costs by reducing the size of the labour force. This may occur through 
reducing the number of people employed, or through retaining employees but reducing 
their paid hours. We expect that the greater wage flexibility offered by performance pay 
contracts will protect employees to some extent from these pressures, meaning that they 
are less likely than fixed-wage workers to experience job loss or hours reductions. 
 
3. Data and earnings measures 
Data: 
We analyse data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (ONS, 
2013).  ASHE is based on a random sample of 1 per cent of all employees in Britain. Their 
employers are surveyed each April and asked to provide a wide range of information about 
the employee's earnings during the preceding year, including the amount of bonus or 
incentive pay received. The survey also asks about the employee's earnings and hours 
during the current pay period (also described as the reference period). The survey is carried 
out by the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) and is mandatory.  
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We augment the ASHE data with information from the ONS Business Structure 
Database (BSD) which is an annual snapshot of all firms in the economy, taken from the 
UK’s official business register (the Inter-Departmental Business Register or IDBR). The 
BSD provides richer information on the characteristics of the employing unit, including 
firm age and foreign ownership (ONS, 2014a).  
We also bring in firm-level data from the ONS Annual Business Survey (the ABS, 
formerly the Annual Respondents Database) (ONS, 2012; ONS 2014b). This is an annual 
census of firms with 250 or more employees, and a sample survey of smaller firms. It 
collects data on the firm’s income and expenditure over the preceding financial year, 
thereby allowing us to bring into ASHE an indicator of the financial performance of the 
firm in those cases where the employee’s firm is also surveyed in the ABS.  
Measures of earnings: 
We focus on the measures of earnings that relate to the preceding year, rather than 
merely the current pay period, in order not to miss any bonus payments that are not paid in 
the pay period covered by ASHE’s April survey date. Forth et al. (2016) show that bonuses 
are highly seasonal. A focus on the April pay period alone thus risks understating the 
importance of bonus payments, and is likely to do so differentially across occupations and 
industries.  
All estimates of pay presented in this paper focus on hourly pay based on total gross 
annual earnings (to be consistent with our annual measure of total incentive pay) and hours 
worked from the reference period to convert this to an hourly rate. Unfortunately, ASHE 
does not contain information on total annual hours worked, so we are reliant on the hours 
recorded for the pay period. The clear drawback is that the hours worked in the reference 
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period may not be typical of those for the remainder of the year. However, this approach is 
adopted in other analyses using ASHE (for example, Bryson et al., 2016) and elsewhere 
Bryson and Forth (forthcoming) show that hours worked in March or April are a good 
proxy for annual hours.3 
 The question about annual incentive pay was first introduced into ASHE in 2002. 
However in this paper we focus on the period from 2005 to 2012 as a change to the design 
and wording of the question in 2005 indicates that the incidence of incentive pay was 
understated in the period 2002-2004. In each year from 2005-2012, employers were asked, 
"For the tax year ending 5 April [year],... how much bonus or incentive payments did the 
employee receive for the current job?". They are instructed to include "profit sharing, 
productivity performance and other bonus or incentive pay, piecework and commission", 
and to exclude "basic, overtime and shift premium pay". Our final analysis sample contains 
a total of 799,942 observations for the period 2005-2012 (see Table 1). As noted earlier, 
this sample, and our analysis, relates to the private sector only. While the use of 
performance pay has been growing in the public sector, it remains far less common than in 
the private sector; furthermore, evidence suggests there are important differences between 
the nature of performance pay and its effects in the two sectors (Bryson et al., forthcoming).  
Our hypotheses relate more clearly to market wage-setting than they do to the public sector 
where considerations other than firm profitability may affect wage determination following 
an economic shock. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Identifying performance pay jobs: 
Our basic measure of earnings focuses on receipt of performance pay. Yet in a given 
year, some individuals will be working in a job where they are eligible to receive 
performance pay, but do not receive a performance payment at that time. If we focus on 
receipt of performance pay alone, we are likely to underestimate the prevalence of 
performance pay jobs, particularly during a downturn. To explore wage flexibility among 
employees in performance pay and non-performance pay jobs, we therefore make use of 
information in ASHE that allows us to identify performance pay jobs, following the work 
of Lemieux et al. (2009) for the US (see Appendix for details). 
 The resulting estimates of performance pay jobs are presented in Figure 1. On this 
basis, just over half of jobs in the private sector were performance pay jobs over the period 
2005-2012. In contrast, only two-fifths of all private sector jobs entailed the receipt of 
performance pay, indicating that around one quarter of all performance pay jobs paid no 
bonus in any given year.  
Our measure may overestimate the number of performance pay jobs if some jobs 
are not covered by a performance pay scheme for the whole of their duration (i.e. if the 
employer introduces or withdraws a performance pay scheme part-way through the period 
for which the job is observed). It may also be an overestimate if some jobs have been 
identified as performance pay jobs but where there are only ever intended to be one-off 
payments, as for example, in the case of jobs involving signing bonuses. However, receipt 
of performance pay did not appear to be particularly high in the first year of performance 
pay jobs. Furthermore, if we alter our definition of a performance pay job so that we only 
classify jobs as performance pay jobs if performance pay is received in at least two years 
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of the job, our main results are substantively unchanged.4 Nevertheless, given the potential 
for overestimating the number of performance pay jobs, the red line in Figure 1 is perhaps 
best considered an upper bound of the prevalence of performance pay jobs. It is noticeable 
from Figure 1 that, whilst receipt dipped in the period 2008-2010, the prevalence of 
performance pay jobs remained broadly stable.  
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
4. Results 
Hypothesis 1: employees in performance pay jobs have experienced greater flexibility in 
earnings than fixed pay employees through recession  
 Here we focus on the degree of wage flexibility that is apparent under different 
wage-setting mechanisms in continuing jobs, with the expectation that, in a longitudinal 
setting, workers in performance pay jobs will experience greater flexibility in their wages 
than workers in fixed pay jobs. On average, in our sample, around 60% of employees in a 
given year are observed in the same job in the following year. 
 Figure 2 shows the percentage of employees experiencing a cut in their nominal 
pay, separately for employees in performance pay and fixed pay jobs (note that the sample 
changes from year to year). We define an employee as having received a nominal pay cut 
where they experienced a fall of more than one per cent in their nominal wage over a year. 
Even prior to recession, a substantial proportion of employees – around 30 per cent in any 
given year - received a cut in their nominal pay, but this figure rose to over 35 per cent in 
2009-2010 following the onset of the recession. In most years, pay cuts were actually more 
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common among fixed pay employees than those in performance pay jobs, but the exception 
is 2009-10, when this pattern was clearly reversed. This was the result of a particularly 
sharp rise in the percentage of performance pay jobs that delivered nominal pay cuts, from 
26 per cent in 2007-8 to 38 per cent in 2009-10. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
 To clarify whether the pattern seen in Figure 2 might be a feature of the wage-
setting mechanism or an incidental product of other observable employee or job 
characteristics, we ran linear estimations of the probability that an employee received a 
nominal pay cut in which we controlled for a range of employee, job and employer 
characteristics. The results are presented in Table 2, which also lists the full set of controls. 
After adding a standard set of controls, the likelihood of experiencing a cut in nominal total 
pay was no different between performance pay and fixed pay jobs in the years leading up 
to the recession. But the likelihood was around one percentage point higher in performance 
pay jobs than in fixed pay jobs in 2008-9 and around 4 percentage points higher in 2009-
10 (see second panel of Table 2).  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
A similar pattern is apparent if we explore growth in log real hourly wages, defined 
as the difference in log real total hourly wages between year t and year t+1 (Table 3). Here 
the coefficient on the performance pay job dummy is either zero or positive from 2005-6 
to 2008-9, but then we see slower real wage growth (or effectively, faster real wage decline) 
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for performance pay employees compared with fixed pay employees between 2009 and 
2010. This accords with the pattern of nominal wage cuts, although here in the case of total 
hourly wages, this pattern is reversed in the following year.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The greater prevalence of nominal pay cuts and slower real wage growth among 
performance pay workers at the onset of recession suggests that their wages were more 
flexible than those of fixed pay workers in the face of the downturn. However, in this 
analysis we are tracking wage changes by reference to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions, as proxied by annual time periods. In practice, there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity across firms within a given year, with some performing better than average, 
and others worse.  
For the subset of employees for whom we have information on the performance of 
the firms in which they work, we can explore the role of firm performance in more detail. 
To do so we match in information on gross value added from the ABS (and the ARD in 
years prior to 2008), using this to construct a measure of quasi-rents calculated as gross 
value added per employee, minus the average industry wage (constructed at the 2 digit 
industry level). This follows the approach taken by Bell and Van Reenen (2011), who were 
in turn inspired by Card et al.’s (2011) study of rent-sharing in Italy. Our preferred 
specification controls for contemporaneous growth in firm performance (measured as log 
growth in our quasi-rent measure, deflated using the GDP deflator), as well as growth in 
the two prior years, and also controls for the level of firm performance in the base year. 
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Our intention is to control for the possibility that the disadvantage experienced by workers 
in performance pay jobs around the time of the downturn may simply reflect a greater 
prevalence of such jobs in firms that suffered most in recession, rather than being a function 
of the wage-setting mechanism per se.   
We are able to construct our measure of quasi-rents (including lags) for between 30 
and 40 per cent of our original sample (varying by year). Repeating the regressions of 
nominal wage cuts and real wage growth for this subset of employees, but without adding 
any controls for firm performance, we find there is still a greater likelihood of nominal 
wage cuts in performance pay jobs in 2009-10 in this sample (third panel of Table 2) and 
still a lower rate of growth in real hourly wages (third panel of Table 3). Once we include 
our controls for firm performance, the coefficients are largely unchanged (fourth panels of 
Tables 2 and 3). Thus workers in performance pay jobs fared worse in terms of wage 
growth between 2009 and 2010 when compared with fixed pay workers, even after 
controlling for variations in the performance of their firms. This result is robust to various 
different specifications of firm performance. It provides further evidence that those 
employers who made a share of their employees’ total wages conditional on output or effort 
were able to use this flexibility to exert greater downward pressure on wage costs when 
macroeconomic conditions changed for the worse.  
 The analysis thus far has focused on total earnings. Our expectation has been that 
the greater flexibility seen in real wages of performance pay workers, compared to fixed 
pay workers, has been exerted through changes in the bonus element of pay. We would 
therefore expect that if we focus on changes in base pay, that we would not see the same 
pattern. Table 4 presents results from equivalent regressions of the growth in log real hourly 
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base pay. In fact, we see that performance pay workers were also more likely to have 
experienced slower growth in real base pay between 2009 and 2010. Hence greater 
flexibility has not been exerted through bonuses alone. Indeed the coefficient is of a similar 
size to that seen in Table 3, suggesting that bonuses and base pay in performance pay jobs 
were restrained to a similar extent. 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 The fact that those in performance pay jobs were more flexible on base pay than 
their fixed pay counterparts could reflect unobserved heterogeneity with respect to job 
characteristics.  To test for this we replaced our single-digit occupational classification with 
a more detailed occupational classification at the three-digit level:  the results were 
essentially unchanged. Alternatively, the finding could reflect unobserved differences 
between performance pay and fixed pay employees. To examine this possibility we 
introduced worker fixed effects in a pooled years regression (Table 5). We divide our 
sample into two periods, with the first capturing the years prior to recession (2005/6 to 
2007/8) and the second corresponding to the period including and following recession 
(2008/9 to 2011/12).5 In line with the yearly results presented in Table 4, for the period 
prior to recession, growth in base pay for performance pay employees is not significantly 
different to that for employees in fixed pay jobs. This remains the case when including 
worker fixed effects. For the period including and post-recession, while we see a negative 
coefficient on our performance pay job dummy in the pooled model, this becomes 
insignificant with the inclusion of worker fixed effects. If we repeat this for growth in total 
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pay and nominal wage cuts, the same results are evident. This suggests that the apparent 
greater wage flexibility is not a result of the wage setting mechanism itself, but that other 
factors are at play. It suggests there may be a degree of negative selection into performance 
pay jobs, and points to the possibility that the greater downward wage pressure experienced 
by workers in performance pay jobs at the onset of recession may actually have come about 
because they had lower bargaining power than equivalent workers in fixed pay jobs.  
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
Hypothesis 2: the extent to which wage flexibility in performance pay jobs exceeds wage 
flexibility in fixed pay jobs will be greater at higher points in the wage distribution 
Table 6 reports results from separate regressions of log real wage growth for each 
quintile of the earnings distribution, after dividing workers into quintiles through reference 
to their base pay at the start of the year. Here we see that in the top two quintiles, log real 
wage growth was actually higher for performance pay workers than fixed pay workers in 
all years of our analysis period. It is only in the bottom quintile that we see lower growth 
in real total wages in performance pay jobs compared to fixed pay jobs in recession years. 
The findings are similar when controlling for firm performance.6 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
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What happens to base pay by quintile? In aggregate we saw slightly lower growth in base 
pay for performance pay workers in 2009/10 compared to fixed pay workers. Again it is 
performance pay workers in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution who see lower 
growth in base wages than fixed pay workers in recession (2009-10, as well as 2011-12 in 
this sample), while in the top quintile, the pattern is reversed (Table 7). In pooled years 
regressions by quintile, for the period prior to recession, we find a significant positive 
coefficient on the performance pay job dummy in all quintiles, which becomes insignificant 
when worker fixed effects are included (Table 8). In the period including and post-
recession, the coefficient on the performance pay job dummy is negative and significant 
for employees in the bottom quintile, but becomes insignificant with the inclusion of 
worker fixed effects. These findings suggest that the apparent differences in wage growth 
between performance pay and fixed pay workers are not a result of the wage-setting 
mechanism itself. The one perhaps somewhat puzzling exception is the second from top 
quintile, where a significant and positive coefficient on the performance pay job dummy 
remains even after the inclusion of worker fixed effects. This is apparent for both growth 
in base pay and growth in total pay. 
 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
We had hypothesised that the separate regressions by earnings quintile might provide 
further evidence that greater wage flexibility occurred through the wage-setting mechanism 
of performance pay.  Instead we find evidence consistent with differential selection into 
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performance pay jobs across the wage distribution. This may be indicative of differences 
in the relative bargaining power of performance pay and fixed pay workers at different 
points in the earnings distribution, with performance pay jobs at the top of the earnings 
distribution going to those with the highest bargaining power, who are then able to extract 
a disproportionate share of any available rents, and performance pay jobs at the bottom of 
the earnings distribution going to those with the lowest bargaining power, who are then 
very limited in their ability to resist employer demands for wage restraint.  
 
Hypothesis 3: performance pay workers were less likely to experience changes in hours 
worked in recession than fixed pay workers 
Our analysis now moves on to look at changes in hours. Our hypothesis was that 
performance pay workers may be less likely to experience reductions in the number of paid 
hours, because of the apparent flexibility present in their wage.  
We look at the percentage change in hours from one year to the next for employees 
who remained in the same job. Here we present pooled results for the periods prior to and 
including/post-recession (Table 9). In aggregate, the hours of performance pay workers 
rose more (or fell less) than did the hours of workers in fixed wage jobs in both periods. 
But again, when exploring differences by quintile, more variation is apparent. In the top 
two quintiles, there is no difference in changes in hours worked between performance pay 
and fixed pay workers. In the middle quintile, hours worked grew by less for performance 
pay workers than fixed pay workers. It is only for those employees in the bottom quintile 
of the earnings distribution where hours worked of performance pay employees increased 
by more (or fell by less) than those of fixed pay workers. These mixed patterns across 
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quintiles mean it is difficult to draw general conclusions as to whether performance pay 
employees fared better or worse in terms of changes in hours worked in recession. Once 
we introduce worker fixed effects, we generally find no significant difference in changes 
in hours worked between performance pay and fixed pay workers. The exception is for 
employees in the bottom quintile of the earnings distribution, in the period prior to 
recession, where once fixed unobserved worker characteristics are accounted for, the 
coefficient on the performance pay job dummy became negative and significant, suggesting 
performance pay workers saw lower growth in hours worked than fixed pay workers. 
However, in the period including and following the recession, there was no discernible 
impact of being in a performance pay job once worker fixed effects were included.    
 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
Hypothesis 4: employees in performance pay jobs experienced longer job tenure through 
recession than employees in non-performance pay jobs 
Where employers are able to adjust labour costs more readily by adjusting bonus 
payments, it may be that employees in performance pay jobs are more likely to hold on to 
their jobs when firms hit hard times. To explore this issue we apply survival analysis to 
explore job tenure among performance pay and fixed pay workers. 
We begin the analysis in 2007, the year prior to recession. We follow individuals 
from 2007 until their job match comes to an end. This may come about because the 
employee moves to another job, which may itself be the choice of either the employer or 
the employee. It may also come about because the employee leaves employment entirely, 
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or their employer may simply have not responded to the survey in that year. We are unable 
to tell with any certainty which of these scenarios applies. Our choice of 2007 as the starting 
year is also helpful because the sample size for ASHE was cut in this year; if we had chosen 
an earlier year as our starting point we would inadvertently have lost some individuals from 
the sample at the point when this reduction was made. 
Figure 3 presents Kaplan-Meier survival plots for the time until the job match 
comes to an end, split according to whether the individual is employed in a performance 
pay job or not. After one year (i.e. in 2008), around 30 per cent of those in performance 
pay jobs in 2007 were no longer in the same job, while for fixed pay jobs, this proportion 
stood at around half. On average, performance pay jobs lasted longer over this period. 
There is a greater hazard of job exit for those in fixed pay jobs. 
Figure 4 extends this to consider differences between those earning above and 
below the median. Those most at hazard of job loss are those in fixed pay jobs earning 
below the median. 
 
[FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE] 
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The top panel of Table 10 then reports results from Cox proportional hazard regressions, 
after controlling for differences in worker and job characteristics. Performance pay workers 
were less likely to end their job match; their hazard rate was 30% lower than for equivalent 
workers in non-performance pay jobs. This finding applied in all quintiles of the earnings 
distribution and was also robust to controlling for differences in firm performance. We had 
hypothesised that performance pay jobs would last longer due to their greater wage 
flexibility, but the limited evidence we find in support of wage flexibility suggests that 
other explanations are warranted instead. One possibility is that performance pay workers 
are keener to remain in their jobs. We know from existing evidence that performance pay 
jobs pay more (Bryson et al., 2016); this could potentially explain the longer observed job 
tenure among performance pay employees.  
 
[TABLE 10 HERE] 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
There is a long-standing macro-economic literature that points to the potential employment 
benefits of pay flexibility induced by pay for performance (Weitzman, 1984). Although the 
notion has been challenged due to potential unintended consequences of sharing profits 
with workers (Gordon, 1982), the basic micro-economic intuition is that, if performance 
pay workers share the income risks of economic shocks with their employers, their earnings 
will be more sensitive to firm performance than their fixed pay counterparts, helping 
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employers to manage labour costs which, in turn, may result in longer job tenure and lower 
base wages. Performance pay employees may experience more stable employment patterns 
than fixed pay workers whose ‘stickier’ wages may make them susceptible to job loss. Ours 
is the first paper to exploit the exogenous shock to firm performance in the Great Recession 
to test these propositions for Britain.   
For employees who remained in the same job from one year to the next, we find 
that performance pay employees were more likely to experience nominal wage cuts than 
fixed pay employees during the recession. This ‘wage gap’ was apparent for hourly wages 
and was not driven by differential hours flexibility. Performance pay workers also 
experienced a slightly greater fall in real wages than non-performance pay workers. This 
finding remained even controlling for variation in firm performance. However, this fall in 
earnings was not purely a result of declines in the performance element of pay – it was also 
apparent in base pay. We speculate that this may reflect differences in bargaining power 
among workers. Once we account for fixed unobserved worker characteristics there is little 
evidence to indicate that wages were more flexible in performance pay jobs.  
Employees’ experiences differed substantially depending on their position in the 
earnings distribution – wages of high earning performance pay workers continued to grow 
faster than those of fixed pay workers. It was only among employees in the bottom quintile 
where earnings growth was significantly lower among performance pay workers. These 
workers experienced cuts in real hourly base pay in 2009-10 and seem to have responded 
with an increase in hours worked. Again, this may be linked to the differential bargaining 
power of workers in different parts of the earnings distribution: it may be that workers paid 
for performance towards the bottom of the earnings distribution are least able to resist 
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downward wage pressures during recession. It is conceivable that positive worker selection 
into performance pay jobs, as proposed by Lazear (1986), for example, operates higher up 
the earnings distribution, but that those entering performance pay jobs at the lower end of 
the earnings distribution are those workers with lower potential earnings who have limited 
outside options. This would accord with Green and Heywood's (2016) finding that workers 
at the lower end of the earnings distribution sacrifice a substantial part of their fixed wage 
when in receipt of bonuses, whereas the degree of substitution is virtually zero among high 
earners.  
Finally we find performance pay employees had longer job tenure than fixed pay 
employees during and after the recession. This alone suggests that performance-related pay 
is no longer, as Wadhwani and Wall (1990) suggested, much ado about nothing.  However, 
unlike the findings in relation to wage growth, performance pay jobs were more likely to 
last than fixed pay jobs among workers across the whole earnings distribution, suggesting 
mechanisms other than a direct link between earnings restraint and job stability are likely 
to be at play.  
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1 The exceptions are perhaps Elsby et al. (2013: 21-22) and Van Wanrooy et al. (2013: 93), both of which briefly 
consider the role of unions.  
2 Using data from the 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Study, Bryson et al. (2014) find the incidence of 
performance pay is four times higher in the private sector than the public sector (28 per cent of employees 
compared with 7 per cent). 
3 We might also be concerned whether hours worked are reported for all workers, or more specifically, whether 
hours were less likely to be reported for certain types of performance pay workers, such as those on piece rates. 
In fact, hours worked are available for the vast majority of employees in the dataset (indeed basic hours are 
imputed in the ASHE data provided unless an employee’s pay has been affected by absence). Among those 
employees for whom hours worked were missing or zero, the proportion receiving any performance pay was 
lower than for all other employees (pooled across all years of our sample), which would suggest we should not 
be overly concerned that our approach has excluded a substantial proportion of PRP workers. 
4 Results available from the authors on request. 
5 It is not possible to add worker fixed-effects to the models for individual years as each worker contributes 
only one observation to each model 
6 Results available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1: Analysis sample 
 
 Observations People Firms Job matches 
 N % N % N % N % 
Full dataset 2002-12: 1,829,087 100.0 334,163 100.0 153,678 100.0 . . 
Job match identifiable:  1,743,246 95.3 326,660 97.8 146,468 95.3% 709,977 100.0 
Private sector only: 1,109,134 60.6 250,056 74.8 127,230 82.8 488,803 68.8 
Private sector, 2005-12 only: 799,942 43.7 219,538 65.7 103,482 67.3 378,567 53.3 
Source: ASHE. 
Excludes small number of individuals with multiple jobs in any given year, and job matches which switch between the public and private sectors 
over time. Public admin and defence, private households and extra-territorial organisations are excluded. 
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Table 2: Any cut in nominal total pay, for employees in same job 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Full sample:        
PRP job (without controls) -0.020*** -0.012** -0.029*** -0.001 0.024*** -0.027*** -0.008* 
 [-4.76] [-2.83] [-6.39] [-0.17] [5.62] [-6.81] [-2.20] 
N 54165 48827 48063 49836 60210 61504 61332 
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Full sample:        
PRP job (with standard controls) 0.000 0.009 -0.005 0.012* 0.037*** -0.005 0.005 
 [-0.01] [1.83] [-1.11] [2.43] [8.19] [-1.28] [1.13] 
N 54165 48827 48063 49836 60210 61504 61332 
adj. R-sq 0.026 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.029 0.025 0.023 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:        
PRP job (without controls) 0.001 -0.003 -0.016 0.016 0.048*** -0.022*** 0.014* 
 [0.07] [-0.34] [-1.76] [1.74] [6.61] [-3.40] [2.20] 
N 16275 15402 14991 16320 24716 27205 26096 
adj. R-sq 0.034 0.024 0.034 0.035 0.029 0.029 0.029 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:        
PRP job (with standard controls, plus firm 
performance) 0.002 -0.005 -0.016 0.012 0.047*** -0.021** 0.014* 
 [0.26] [-0.50] [-1.68] [1.33] [6.35] [-3.19] [2.20] 
N 16275 15402 14991 16320 24716 27205 26096 
adj. R-sq 0.035 0.025 0.035 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.031 
Source: ASHE. 
Standard controls: industry (1 digit), occupation (1 digit), gender, age, full-time/part-time status, job tenure, whether permanent/temporary job, whether covered 
by a collective agreement, region (9 regions), firm size, whether firm foreign-owned, firm age. 
t-statistics in parentheses (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 3: Average annual growth in the log of total real hourly pay, for employees in same job 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Full sample:        
PRP job (without controls) 0.011* 0.002 0.013** -0.011* -0.012** 0.013*** -0.014*** 
 [2.30] [0.34] [2.60] [-2.41] [-2.97] [3.44] [-3.88] 
N 54,165 48,827 48,063 49,836 60,210 61,504 61,332 
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Full sample:        
PRP job (with standard controls) 0.007 -0.001 0.013* -0.005 -0.009* 0.009* -0.003 
 [1.44] [-0.16] [2.41] [-1.19] [-2.47] [2.31] [-0.80] 
N 54,165 48,827 48,063 49,836 60,210 61,504 61,332 
adj. R-sq 0.013 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.02 0.013 0.018 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:        
PRP job (without controls) -0.007 0.009 0.012 -0.012 -0.019** 0.006 -0.009 
 [-0.70] [1.01] [1.06] [-1.32] [-3.04] [1.04] [-1.60] 
N 16,275 15,402 14,991 16,320 24,716 27,205 26,096 
adj. R-sq 0.014 0.021 0.02 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.026 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:        
PRP job (with standard controls, plus firm 
performance) -0.008 0.011 0.012 -0.009 -0.017** 0.006 -0.009 
 [-0.71] [1.21] [1.06] [-1.03] [-2.71] [0.96] [-1.64] 
N 16,275 15,402 14,991 16,320 24,716 27,205 26,096 
adj. R-sq 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.02 0.025 0.017 0.026 
Source: ASHE. 
Standard controls: see Table 2. 
t-statistics in parentheses (* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 4: Average annual growth in the log of real hourly base pay, for employees in same job 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Full sample:        
PRP job (without controls) 0.008 -0.009 0.005 -0.007 -0.015*** 0.006 -0.016*** 
 [1.67] [-1.86] [1.03] [-1.46] [-3.82] [1.52] [-4.17] 
N 54097 48781 48004 49765 60131 61432 61254 
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Full sample:        
PRP job (with standard controls) 0.005 -0.007 0.006 -0.004 -0.011** 0.003 -0.006 
 [1.00] [-1.53] [1.17] [-0.92] [-2.98] [0.66] [-1.67] 
N 54097 48781 48004 49765 60131 61432 61254 
adj. R-sq 0.011 0.015 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.016 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:        
PRP job (without controls) -0.005 0.001 0.007 -0.014 -0.022*** -0.002 -0.011 
 [-0.50] [0.08] [0.59] [-1.54] [-3.51] [-0.27] [-1.93] 
N 16262 15395 14981 16307 24702 27195 26083 
adj. R-sq 0.012 0.019 0.018 0.014 0.023 0.016 0.026 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:        
PRP job (with standard controls, plus firm 
performance) -0.005 0.003 0.007 -0.012 -0.019** -0.002 -0.012* 
 [-0.48] [0.33] [0.62] [-1.35] [-3.06] [-0.32] [-2.02] 
N 16262 15395 14981 16307 24702 27195 26083 
adj. R-sq 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.023 0.016 0.026 
Source: ASHE. 
Standard Controls: see Table 2. 
t-statistics in parentheses (p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 5: Average annual growth in the log of real hourly base pay, for employees in same 
job, pre and post-recession 
 
 Pre-recession (2005/6-2007/8) Post-recession (2008/9-2011/12) 
 Pooled 
Pooled with 
fixed effects Pooled 
Pooled with 
fixed effects 
Full sample:     
PRP job (without controls) 0.002 0.046 -0.008*** 0.005 
 [0.78] [1.36] [-4.49] [0.34] 
N 150882 49557 232582 78475 
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.03 0.003 -0.012 
Full sample:     
PRP job (with standard controls) 0.002 0.03 -0.005** -0.008 
 [0.67] [0.91] [-2.64] [-0.47] 
N 150882 49557 232582 78475 
adj. R-sq 0.011 0.062 0.016 0.017 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:     
PRP job (with standard controls, but not firm 
performance) 0.001 0.092 -0.011*** -0.019 
 [0.22] [0.90] [-3.72] [-0.54] 
N 46638 15378 94287 32888 
adj. R-sq 0.014 0.109 0.016 0.029 
Sub-sample with data on firm performance:     
PRP job (with standard controls, plus firm 
performance) 0.001 0.093 -0.010*** -0.017 
 [0.18] [0.91] [-3.55] [-0.50] 
N 46638 15378 94287 32888 
adj. R-sq 0.014 0.109 0.016 0.029 
Source: ASHE. 
Standard Controls: see Table 2. 
t-statistics in parentheses (p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 6: Average annual growth in log of total real hourly wages, for employees in same 
job, by earnings quintile (full sample) 
 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Top quintile 0.084*** 0.063*** 0.103*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.091*** 
 [5.78] [5.87] [7.23] [6.40] [8.21] [8.72] [11.17] 
N 11679 11060 10440 10798 12887 13190 13354 
adj. R-sq 0.218 0.205 0.252 0.202 0.231 0.256 0.21 
2nd quintile 0.030*** 0.014 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.017*** 
 [4.69] [1.86] [5.26] [4.08] [4.20] [4.89] [3.44] 
N 11816 10642 10619 10853 12917 13215 13268 
adj. R-sq 0.112 0.081 0.12 0.118 0.119 0.151 0.12 
Middle quintile 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.038*** 0.013* 0.009 0.025*** 0.021*** 
 [3.92] [3.51] [5.45] [2.12] [1.62] [4.30] [4.17] 
N 11051 9923 10034 10404 12525 12709 12745 
adj. R-sq 0.082 0.068 0.074 0.071 0.078 0.064 0.08 
4th quintile 0.014* 0.008 0.015* 0.002 0.003 0.028*** 0.007 
 [1.97] [1.13] [2.11] [0.28] [0.51] [4.52] [1.39] 
N 10758 9563 9461 9745 11885 12168 12002 
adj. R-sq 0.052 0.049 0.044 0.052 0.036 0.038 0.042 
Bottom quintile -0.008 -0.004 -0.006 -0.041* -0.046*** -0.025 -0.053*** 
 [-0.52] [-0.23] [-0.31] [-2.54] [-3.31] [-1.79] [-3.73] 
N 8861 7639 7509 8036 9996 10222 9963 
adj. R-sq 0.046 0.044 0.05 0.047 0.053 0.039 0.05 
Source: ASHE. 
Quintiles are defined with respect to the base wage. 
Models show the coefficient on the dummy variable identifying performance pay jobs.  
Controls: industry (1 digit), occupation (1 digit), gender, age, full-time/part-time status, job tenure, whether 
permanent/temporary job, whether covered by a collective agreement, region (9 regions), firm size, whether 
firm foreign-owned, firm age. 
t-statistics in parentheses (p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 7: Average annual growth in log of real hourly base pay, for employees in same job, by earnings quintile (full sample) 
 
 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 
Top quintile 0.066*** 0.043*** 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.079*** 
 [4.48] [4.01] [5.62] [5.99] [7.28] [6.47] [9.50] 
N 11668 11058 10427 10789 12880 13186 13345 
adj. R-sq 0.212 0.193 0.226 0.203 0.223 0.232 0.205 
2nd quintile 0.021** 0.002 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.012* 
 [3.16] [0.30] [3.59] [3.41] [3.38] [3.30] [2.45] 
N 11809 10640 10613 10847 12913 13209 13262 
adj. R-sq 0.098 0.067 0.111 0.104 0.118 0.147 0.118 
Middle quintile 0.022*** 0.015* 0.029*** 0.011 0.008 0.017** 0.017*** 
 [3.30] [2.04] [4.12] [1.69] [1.60] [2.89] [3.31] 
N 11046 9922 10025 10397 12520 12704 12735 
adj. R-sq 0.082 0.065 0.066 0.072 0.082 0.058 0.079 
4th quintile 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.005 0.001 0.026*** 0.007 
 [1.64] [0.76] [1.53] [0.69] [0.15] [4.30] [1.32] 
N 10751 9561 9457 9742 11881 12165 11999 
adj. R-sq 0.053 0.048 0.043 0.051 0.035 0.04 0.042 
Bottom quintile 0.031 0.022 0.02 -0.012 -0.031* -0.005 -0.034* 
 [1.82] [1.31] [1.05] [-0.73] [-2.08] [-0.34] [-2.31] 
N 8823 7600 7482 7990 9937 10168 9913 
adj. R-sq 0.06 0.051 0.06 0.063 0.059 0.046 0.057 
Source: ASHE. 
Quintiles are defined with respect to the base wage. 
Models show the coefficient on the dummy variable identifying performance pay jobs.  
Controls: see Table 6.  
t-statistics in parentheses (p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 8: Average annual growth in log of real hourly base pay, for employees in same 
job, by earnings quintile (full sample), pre and post- recession 
 
 Pre-recession (2005/6-2007/8) Post-recession (2008/9-2011/12) 
 Pooled 
Pooled with fixed 
effects Pooled 
Pooled with fixed 
effects 
Top quintile 0.066*** 0.124 0.067*** 0.068 
 [7.90] [1.65] [13.73] [1.74] 
N 33153 10771 50200 17541 
adj. R-sq 0.209 0.701 0.212 0.619 
2nd quintile 0.016*** 0.009 0.018*** 0.056* 
 [4.11] [0.29] [6.53] [2.09] 
N 33062 11036 50231 18096 
adj. R-sq 0.087 0.458 0.122 0.517 
Middle quintile 0.022*** 0.06 0.013*** 0.016 
 [5.53] [0.47] [4.55] [0.60] 
N 30993 10667 48356 17416 
adj. R-sq 0.071 0.516 0.075 0.498 
4th quintile 0.010* 0.07 0.010** 0.011 
 [2.28] [1.06] [3.19] [0.25] 
N 29769 9645 45787 15005 
adj. R-sq 0.045 0.567 0.042 0.402 
Bottom quintile 0.023* 0.033 -0.019* -0.136 
 [2.28] [0.22] [-2.46] [-1.28] 
N 23905 7438 38008 10417 
adj. R-sq 0.053 0.353 0.054 0.452 
     
Source: ASHE. 
Quintiles are defined with respect to the base wage. 
Models show the coefficient on the dummy variable identifying performance pay jobs.  
Controls: see Table 6.  
t-statistics in parentheses (p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 9: Percentage growth in hours worked, for employees in same job, for all 
employees and by earnings quintile (full sample), pre and post-recession  
 
 Pre-recession (2005/6-2007/8) Post-recession (2008/9-2011/12) 
 Pooled 
Pooled with fixed 
effects Pooled 
Pooled with fixed 
effects 
All employees 0.002** -0.005 0.001*** 0.002 
 [2.67] [-0.74] [3.45] [0.61] 
N 144304 47342 226915 77562 
adj. R-sq 0.009 -0.022 0.013 -0.035 
Top quintile 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.01 
 [-0.39] [-0.12] [-1.68] [1.60] 
N 31883 10346 48923 17246 
adj. R-sq 0.028 0.159 0.03 0.147 
2nd quintile 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.001 
 [0.40] [0.13] [1.31] [-0.10] 
N 31732 10629 48776 17761 
adj. R-sq 0.022 0.14 0.023 0.091 
Middle quintile -0.005*** -0.014 -0.002* -0.008 
 [-3.91] [-0.45] [-2.35] [-0.73] 
N 29427 10159 46473 16949 
adj. R-sq 0.022 0.157 0.031 0.16 
4th quintile 0.000 -0.01 -0.001 -0.002 
 [0.01] [-0.32] [-1.20] [-0.13] 
N 27741 8965 43259 14349 
adj. R-sq 0.032 0.281 0.03 0.219 
Bottom quintile 0.005* -0.084* 0.005*** 0.025 
 [2.49] [-2.03] [3.48] [0.96] 
N 20243 6359 32713 9273 
adj. R-sq 0.015 0.22 0.018 0.173 
     
Source: ASHE. 
Quintiles are defined with respect to the base wage. 
Models show the coefficient on the dummy variable identifying performance pay jobs.  
Controls: see Table 6.  
t-statistics in parentheses (p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
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Table 10: Hazard ratios for job exit, PRP jobs versus non-PRP jobs 
  Robust   
 Hazard ratio Std. Err. t-statistic N 
     
Full sample 0.709 0.005 -47.64 207441 
     
Top quintile 0.670 0.012 -22.78 44588 
2nd quintile 0.707 0.012 -20.81 44792 
Middle quintile 0.708 0.012 -20.58 42067 
4th quintile 0.710 0.012 -20.81 39255 
Bottom quintile 0.732 0.012 -19.7 30169 
     
Controlling for performance:     
Full sample 0.711 0.009 -25.64 72570 
     
Top quintile 0.726 0.024 -9.63 16853 
2nd quintile 0.686 0.021 -12.55 16332 
Middle quintile 0.722 0.023 -10.17 13464 
4th quintile 0.677 0.020 -13.32 13768 
Bottom quintile 0.729 0.019 -12.05 11018 
Source: ASHE. 
Quintiles are defined with respect to the base wage. 
Models show the coefficient on the dummy variable identifying performance pay jobs.  
Controls: see Table 6.  
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Figure 1: Performance Pay receipt and Performance Pay jobs, 2005-2012, private sector  
 
Source: ASHE.  
 
Figure 2: Employees receiving a cut in total nominal pay 
 
Source: ASHE. 
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Figure 3: Survival plots for job exit 
 
Source: ASHE 
 
 
Figure 4: Survival plots for job exit, by earnings 
 
Source: ASHE 
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Appendix 
Identifying performance pay jobs: 
We are able to follow employees in ASHE from one year to the next using the unique 
person identifier. We then define an employee as remaining in the same job from one year to 
the next where that employee: (i) works for the same employer (identified using the IDBR 
enterprise reference number); (ii) has remained in the same job according to the employer’s 
response in the survey; and (iii) has remained within the same four digit occupation (using the 
Standard Occupational Classification).i  
Following the work of Lemieux et al. (2009) for the US, we then identify performance 
pay jobs as those in which performance pay has been paid in any of the years in which we 
observe that job. Our definition of a job match differs from that used by Lemieux et al. (2009), 
in that their job match is effectively an “employer match”, i.e. the spell an individual spends 
with a particular employer. This is likely to cause an upward bias in our estimates of the 
prevalence of performance pay in cases where employees move between performance pay and 
non-performance pay jobs during their tenure within a given firm, as may occur if an employee 
is promoted to a managerial position. Our approach addresses this issue by beginning a new 
job match if the employer indicates that the employee has transferred to a new job in the 
organisation, or if the employee moves to a different four-digit occupation. 
Identifying performance pay jobs in this way suffers from the problem that jobs 
observed near the beginning and end of our time period are less likely to be identified as 
performance pay jobs, simply because we observe them for fewer years. Following Lemieux’s 
approach we apply an ‘endpoint adjustment’ which constructs an adjusted measure of the 
                                                 
i One might be concerned about minor variations in the SOC code from year to year caused by respondent or 
coding errors. However, among employees who remain with the same employer across two years, and for whom 
the employer states that the employee is working in the same job as last year, the SOC code typically matches at 
the four-digit level (this applies in 95 per cent of cases). We are therefore confident that our use of a four-digit 
SOC code does not artificially inflate the number of job matches.  
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prevalence of performance pay jobs. We estimate probit models based on the number of times 
a job match is observed and use the resulting predicted probabilities to construct a weight which 
then effectively holds the distribution of the number of times a job match is observed to that 
observed in the middle of our sample. Our endpoint adjustment has been calculated on the basis 
of data for the period 2002 to 2012, so our midpoint here is 2007.    
 
